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coin in the same act. The coin, called the
trime, had a metallic value worth only
about 2
1/2 cents, but was legal tender for
sums up to 30 cents, making it our first
money with a content in precious metal
worth less than its legal value in trade
(sometimes called a “subsidiary coin.”)
The trime was 20 percent smaller than
our modern dime, and only about one-
third of its weight (figure 1). While the
British were on a gold standard and had
been using subsidiary silver coins for
small change for nearly 40 years, the
trime was a decided break from the
American experience. 
Why did Congress choose to reduce the
silver content of the 3-cent coin? The
answer to this question begins on Janu-
ary 24, 1848, when James Marshall, who
was building a saw mill for John Sutter
on the American River near Sacramento,
California, found a few tiny gold
nuggets. The discovery began the great-
est migration of people in U.S. history,
as a half-million people descended upon
California. The gold rush was on.
■ California Gold, Gresham’s
Law, and Indivisible Money 
Between 1849 and 1853, the amount of
gold coming out of California was stag-
gering. People of all walks of life left
their jobs and their families and headed to
California in search of fortune. The
expansion of gold in circulation was 
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You might not have heard of the
trime, the tiny 3-cent silver coin
minted in the United States from
1851 to 1873, but it may have played
a big role in shaping the kind of
money you carry around in your 
wallet today.
In 1851, under severe competitive 
pressure, the U.S. postal service lowered
the postage on a one-page letter from 
5 cents to 3 cents. The act changed the
character of American money. 
This Commentary tells how a conflu-
ence of two events, the expansion of
steam-powered transportation and the
California gold rush, created a problem
of “monetary indivisibility” for the U.S.
post office, the solution to which was the
minting of a 3-cent silver coin, the trime.
Besides being the smallest of all U.S.
coins, the trime had another distinction:
It was the first legal tender with a face
value greater than the market value of
the metal it was minted from. The trime
was America’s first step toward separat-
ing its money from precious metals and
the eventual creation of our “fiat”
money—a money that is not backed by
or convertible into any commodity. That
is, a money with no intrinsic worth.
■ Railroads, Postage Stamps,
and Indivisible Money
In the early to mid-nineteenth century,
the U.S. postal service, the largest U.S.
commercial enterprise of the era, had a
virtual monopoly on mail delivery
between major cities, the large profits
from which it doled out in political
patronage.1 But the postal service’s
stranglehold on mail delivery began to
loosen with the great expansion of cheap
rail and steamship transportation.
Between 1840 and 1850, track in opera-
tion more than doubled to 6,000 miles,
and the cost of shipping by rail fell
nearly 40 percent. As travel became
more routine, large volumes of mail
began being carried by ordinary travel-
ers and “express companies,” which
delivered pouches and boxes of mail
between cities. The postal monopoly
was crumbling. 
In 1845, Congress cut postage rates by
more than half, to 5 cents for a one-page
letter delivered within 500 miles. But by
the late 1840s, private express compa-
nies were delivering mail between major
cities for 2 cents a letter, and the compe-
tition from the private carriers pressured
government postage rates even lower. In
1851, Congress reduced the postage rate
to 3 cents a letter. 
The drop in postage to 3 cents created a
monetary problem. Gold coins were only
produced in denominations of $1 and
above because smaller denominations
would require coins so small that they
would be impractical in trade. Silver
coins, which were relatively awkward for
denominations of more than one dollar
because they would have been too heavy
to be conveniently carried, were only 
produced in denominations of $1, $0.50,
$0.25, $0.10, and $0.05. While copper
cents and half cents were minted, the cir-
culation of the coins was mostly limited
to the major eastern cities and, even there,
they were unpopular with the public.2
Because the nation had no widely circu-
lating money in a denomination less than
5 cents, many people would have been
forced to buy the new 3-cent stamps in
bundles of five or ten. 
The problem confronting the United
States with the drop in postage is
referred to as “monetary indivisibility,”
and it is a common shortcoming of mon-
etary systems in which the value of the
money is tied to a particular good (a
“commodity” money). The problem
occurs when the smallest denomination
of money is too large for people to trade
effectively. 
To solve the monetary indivisibility cre-
ated by the new 3-cent stamp, Congress
authorized the minting of a 3-cent silverspectacular. Over this four-year period,
the U.S. Mint coined four times more
gold than it had produced in total since its
founding in 1792. But of course, with the
flood of gold came a decline in its value,
and this drop in gold prices created some-
thing of a monetary crisis for the nation.
At the time, the United States had a
bimetallic commodity money standard; a
dollar was defined in terms of a specific
quantity of silver (371.25 grains) or gold
(23.2 grains)—a fixed ratio of 16-to-1.
Because the value of gold was falling, the
“dollar” cost of things was rising, what
economists today might call “inflation.” 
But there was another, even greater mon-
etary problem created by the gold rush.
The falling market value of gold relative
to silver meant, alternatively, that the
market value of silver was rising relative
to gold. In other words, it would cost the
mint more than 3 cents to purchase the
silver required to produce the trime at the
fixed 16-to-1 ratio of silver to gold.
The market values of gold and silver
were often out of alignment with their
official (or “face”) values, and when this
occurred, coins containing the more pre-
cious of the two metals would either
trade at a premium (that is, trade above
their face value) or disappear from 
circulation altogether as a result of
hoarding or export.3An “undervalued”
(good) money driven from circulation by
an “overvalued” (bad) money is called 
Gresham’s Law. It was a major short-
coming of America’s bimetallic mone-
tary system. 
In figure 2, I show the market value of
gold relative to silver in the United
States between 1843 and 1863. I esti-
mate that the “export threshold” of 
silver was about 1 percent of the 16-to-1
ratio, which covers the cost of culling,
brokerage, and transportation.4 Below
this level, the market value of silver is
sufficiently more than its face value that
it becomes profitable to export.
Almost coincident with the discovery 
of gold in California, the value of gold 
relative to silver fell below the export
threshold, meaning that silver money
was too valuable to circulate at its 
official 16-to-1 ratio with gold. Had the
government minted a 3-cent silver coin
with a silver content commensurate
with the 16-to-1 ratio, these coins would
likely have been exported or hoarded.
Very few of them would have purchased
stamps at the post office. 
So in reducing the silver value of the
trime to approximately 2
1/2 cents, Con-
gress effectively eliminated any incen-
tive for the public to export its silver. But
in doing so, Congress also crossed into
rather uncharted and controversial mone-
tary ground by authorizing a legal tender
that had value based on their say-so and
not on its metal content.  
Even though its small size made it
awkward to use in exchange, the trime
enjoyed a rather wide circulation
between 1851 and 1853; almost 25 mil-
lion of the coins were minted—more
than three times the number of all the
other silver coins combined. Yet despite
its relatively large production numbers,
the trime was incapable of carrying the
coinage load that was being placed on it.
All silver coins were disappearing from
circulation as the price of gold fell. In
1850 and 1851, the United States
exported $25 million more in silver than
it imported, an amount that exceeded the
nation’s total silver coinage of the pre-
ceding 20 years.5 The “bad” gold money
was driving the “good” silver money
from the economy, and monetary indi-
visibility was getting worse.
Monetary indivisibility is a consequence
of the operation of Gresham’s Law that
is not commonly appreciated.6 Since
gold coins were of relatively large
denomination and silver coins were of
small denomination, the exit of silver
from circulation introduced a shortage of
small change. Other than the trime and
the slighted cent, the smallest denomina-
tion of U.S. money minted in any signifi-
cant amount in the first few years of the
1850s was the $1 gold piece, roughly the
equivalent to the average worker’s daily
wage. In today’s wages, that sum trans-
lates to a little more than $100. Imagine
trying to buy things when the smallest
coin in your pocket is $100 and you have
little prospect of receiving change in
return. The problem of monetary indivis-
ibility was no longer about mere postage
stamps, it had become a pervasive prob-
lem in the retail marketplace. 
■ The Subsidiary Coinage Act
of 1853
In 1851, retail trade heavily depended on
the trime and the cent, which despite its
general disfavor in the public, began
being minted in much larger quantities.
The only other coins that circulated with
a face value under a dollar were “a mot-
ley collection of underweight coins,”
including “badly worn” Spanish “bits.”
A customer who offered a gold dollar
in payment for a small article would
receive in exchange perhaps ten or 
fifteen 3-cent pieces and a half-dozen
almost unrecognizable reals and
medios. A Philadelphia paper refers
derisively to shopkeepers scooping up
3-cent pieces with a ladle to make
change for a $5 bank-note.7
Retailers were paying large premiums
on silver coins, and some, including the
post office, began to require exact
change transactions. Some merchants
offered tokens exchangeable for goods
and small private notes, mockingly
called “shinplasters” by the public, and
these were also flooding the market. On
February 21, 1853, Congress settled on
a solution to the coin shortage. They
decided to make all silver coins denomi-
nated in values less than a dollar sub-
sidiary coins, just as they had with the
trime. The silver content of all coins
under a dollar was reduced 7 percent,
but they retained the same face values
and would be legal tender for amounts
up to 5 dollars. (Figure 2 shows the
value of the silver used in these coins
relative to the prevailing gold-to-silver
price ratio.)
Those who favored keeping the dollar on
a bimetallic standard were at a loss on
how to maintain the two metals and still
deal with the coin shortage. Some in
Congress hoped to eventually provide for
two circulating metals by adjusting the
official gold-to-silver price ratio down-
ward from 16-to-1 after the value of the
two metals resumed “a reasonable degree
of stability.” Since the act left the silver
content in the silver dollar the same,
many in Congress may have believed
they were maintaining the bimetallic
standard for the dollar. But clearly, there
were some, including House Ways and
Means chairman C. L. Dunham, whose
intent was to move the country away
from bimetallism to a monometallic
(gold) standard, similar to that used in
Great Britain.
We intend to do what the best writers on
political economy have approved, what
experience, where the experiment has
been tried, has demonstrated to be the
best, and what the Committee believe to
be necessary and proper, to make but
one standard of currency and to make
all others subservient to it. We mean to
make gold the standard coin…8
Even those who voted in favor of the
measure may not have fully appreciatedthe significance of creating subsidiary
coinage. Some, including Andrew John-
son, wondered scornfully how the gov-
ernment, by a simple decree, could
cause the value of small coins to be 
7 percent more than their value in silver. 
I look upon this bill as the merest
quackery—the veriest charlatanism—
so far as the currency of the country is
concerned. The idea of Congress fix-
ing the value of the currency is an
absurdity, notwithstanding the lan-
guage of the Constitution—not the
meaning of it… If we can, by law,
make $107 out of $100, we can, by the
same process, make it worth $150.
Why, Sir, of all the problems that have
come up for solution, from the time of
the alchemists down to the present
time, none can compare with that
solved by this modern Congress. They
alone have discovered that they can
make money—that they can make
$107 out of $100.9
In 1853, almost 62 million subsidiary
coins were minted, and before the year’s
end, there were enough small coins in
circulation to satisfy the demands of
commerce. The coins traded at their face
values, and the monetary crisis was over.
■ On the Road to Fiat
Over time, the goal of the gold-standard
advocates was realized. Less than a
decade after the creation of subsidiary
coinage, the U.S. Civil War brought a
shortage of all metals, including copper
and gold. Shinplasters again flooded
retail markets. The federal government
accepted postage stamps as money for
values up to $5 (1862), issued paper
notes in fractional amounts (1863), and
suspended the convertibility of large-
denomination notes for gold (1862).
After the Civil War, the Coinage Act of
1873 omitted the silver dollar from its list
of coins, and when the convertibility of
large notes for metal was resumed in
1879, convertibility was in gold only. The
dollar was officially on a gold standard.
But the “absurdity” described by
Andrew Johnson, that the government
could simply decree a value for its
money that was disconnected from its
metallic worth, would also eventually
come true. In 1933, during the financial
crisis brought about by the national
depression, and faced with huge foreign
outflows of gold, President Roosevelt
nationalized the monetary gold owned
by U.S. citizens and abrogated contracts
that specified payment in gold. Only
foreign central banks could convert dol-
lars into gold. 
Between 1946 and 1971, much of the
world operated under the so-called Bret-
ton Woods system, which pegged for-
eign currencies to the dollar, while the
United States promised to redeem cen-
tral banks’holdings of dollars for gold
at a fixed price of $35 per ounce. But
persistent balance-of-payments deficits
during the 1960s once again drained
U.S. gold reserves and on August 15,
1971, President Nixon announced that
the United States would no longer
redeem dollars held by foreign central
banks for gold. This act severed the last
thread connecting the value of the dollar
to a precious metal.
Today, the U.S. dollar, like the money
of virtually every other nation, is on a
“fiat” standard, which means that it is
not backed by or convertible into any
commodity.10 Its value is determined
only by a merchant’s willingness to
accept it in trade. The record of these
monies in being able to maintain their
purchasing power has been mixed.
Most nations experienced a turbulent
period of recurring inflation in the
1970s and 1980s as their central banks
allowed the expansion of their monies
to greatly exceed demand for them.
Today, most nations are providing
greater stability to the purchasing
power of their money. Some nations
have gone so far as to require their cen-
tral banks to achieve specific inflation
targets, while others have joined mone-
tary unions, and some have even
adopted a more stable foreign money 
as their own (an arrangement called
“dollarization.”) 
In 1977 and 1978, Congress made price
stability a long-run objective of the
Federal Reserve, so even though the
country no longer ties its money to a
precious metal, the central bank is
expected to limit the expansion of our
money to match the trade needs of the
nation. In this way, the Federal Reserve
anchors a dollar’s value to its ability to
purchase the broad array of goods and
services consumed in the United States.
And the first step toward the fiat stan-
dard on which our money now rests
may have begun 153 years ago, when
the federal government was forced to
reduce the price of a postage stamp to 
3 cents. 
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■ Footnotes
1. See Olds (2002).  
2. Why these copper pieces were so
disliked is unclear, but the coins had
many perceived shortcomings. Cents
and half-cents had an uncertain legal-
tender status, they were very heavy for
their value, and they were prone to dis-
coloration. The cent was formally made
legal tender (for sums up to 10 cents) in
1864.
3. Rolnick and Weber (1986) describe
the conditions when an “undervalued”
commodity money will circulate at a
premium, and when it will disappear
from circulation.  
4. See Martin (1973, p. 830).
5. See Carothers (1930, p. 108).
6. The problem of bimetallic coinage is
described in great detail by Sargent and
Velde (2002).
7. Carothers (1930, pp. 110–11). 
Spanish reals (silver dollars), also known
as “pieces of eight” were commonly
divided into eight pie-shaped “bits,” each
with a value of 12
1/2 cents. A small Span-
ish coin called the “medio,” valued at 
6
1/4 cents, was also in wide circulation in
the United States in the mid-nineteenth
century.
8. Hepburn (1924, p. 64).
9. Hepburn (1924, p. 65).
10. There is some disagreement among
economists over the precise meaning of
fiat money, and a comparison of two
textbooks on money and banking is
unlikely to yield the same definition.
Alternative definitions include a money
that is produced and circulates at no cost,
while another popular description is that
it is a money created by order of the 
government.